Author Topic: Kennedy and the Cold War  (Read 6186 times)

TLR

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Kennedy and the Cold War
« on: July 17, 2013, 10:32:31 pm »
2/22/1961 In a letter to Khrushchev, JFK invited him to a summit later in the year; the letter was not declassified until 10/1984. It was rather conciliatory, and Kennedy suggested that they "make more use of diplomatic channels for quiet informal discussion..."   

3/17/1961 JFK lifted a ban on importation and distribution of communist literature into the US.

3/18/1961 Washington Post reported that President Kennedy ordered the Post Office to stop holding up Communist propaganda received in the mail from abroad. "A review...has disclosed that the program serves no useful intelligence function."

4/7/1961 St Louis Globe Democrat reported that "fingerprinting of alien nationals entering the US was abolished. The State Department explained that the procedure had been 'an affront to communist newsmen and UN employees.'"

4/18/1961 Kennedy wrote to Khrushchev about Cuba, assuring him that "the United States intends no military intervention in Cuba" but urged him to understand that the Cuban exiles wanted to oust the dictator Castro: "recourse to such struggle is the only means of achieving their liberties....While refraining from military intervention...the United States government can take no action to stifle the spirit of liberty." He also asked Khrushchev not to let the Bay of Pigs worsen relations between the US and USSR, and expressed his desire for a "treaty for the banning of nuclear tests." (JFK Wants to Know 59-60)

6/3-4/1961: Summit between JFK and Khrushchev at Vienna; little of substance agreed upon. After the summit, US News & World Report stated that Khrushchev found JFK to be a "pushover." At one point, he recalled his "kitchen debate" with Nixon, who thought that a Miracle Kitchen would convert Russians to capitalism; Khrushchev said, "only Nixon could have thought of such nonsense." The only point of agreement was a "neutralist" coalition government in Laos; Khrushchev went out of his way to intimidate JFK, who said finally, 'It's going to be a cold winter.'" Khrushchev was quoted as saying, "I think that I have taught that young man what fear is."

7/13/1961 Dallas Morning News reported that the administration had lent Poland $2.5 million to buy a US-made steel finishing plant.

8/4/1961 Human Events magazine reported: "officials in the US Department of Agriculture and the Commerce Department agreed to sell surplus wheat to the Soviet Union for $.62 per bushel less than the baker who bakes your bread pays for it. Only quick action by an awakening public stopped this folly...The officials who initiated the program are still holding responsible government positions."

8/25/1961 Congressman Thomas Pelly, in Human Events, complained that while the Berlin crisis was going on, the administration was approving aid in the form of synthetic rubber to the USSR and railway equipment and scrap iron to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. 

8/28/1961 Sen. Thomas Dodd, in Los Angeles, told the Southern California School of Anti-Communism, "There is a developing mood of anger and frustration in this country and there ought to be for we are losing round after round in the Cold War and our people do not like it...the last 16 years have witnessed a calamitous retreat from victory...Since the beginning of this year alone there has been the sealing-off of East Berlin, the disaster in Laos, the fiasco in Cuba, and only last week, the victory of Cheddi Jagan and his communist-dominated Peoples Progressive Party in British Guiana elections...The next five years will contain a series of decisive battles which will determine for centuries to come whether mankind is to live in freedom or live in slavery." (None Dare Call it Treason)

9/1/1961 The Soviets resumed atmospheric nuclear testing with a series of 50 tests that continued for the next two months.

9/3/1961 JFK proposed an immediate ban on atmospheric nuclear tests.

9/5/1961 JFK ordered resumption of atomic testing, suspended since 10/1958, in response to the Soviet testing of two more hydrogen bombs.

9/8/1961 Sen. Thomas Dodd declared that it "is not the business of the UN to go about overthrowing anti-communist governments..."   

9/12/1961 Rep. Donald C. Bruce (R-Indiana) charged "the US State Department...is acquiescing in the communist takeover of the Congo...over a period of years the tragic growth of communism and its victories in one area after another of the world forms a consistent pattern. What is wrong with our State Department?"
« Last Edit: November 08, 2013, 07:40:01 pm by TLR »

TLR

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Re: Kennedy and the Cold War
« Reply #1 on: July 17, 2013, 10:34:35 pm »
9/29/1961 Khrushchev had sent his first private letter to Kennedy on September 29, 1961, during the Berlin crisis. Wrapped in a newspaper, it was brought to Kennedy's press secretary Pierre Salinger at a New York hotel room by a Soviet "magazine editor " and KGB agent, Georgi Bolshakov, whom Khrushchev trusted to maintain silence. The secrecy was at least as much to avoid Soviet attention as American. As presidential aide Theodore Sorensen said three decades later, Khrushchev was " taking his risks, assuming that these letters were, as we believe, being kept secret from the ( Soviet) military, from the foreign service, from the top people in the Kremlin. He was taking some risk that if discovered, they would be very unhappy with him. " (Paul Wells, " Private Letters Shed Light on Cold War, " Montreal Gazette (July 24, 1993). The private letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev, known as the " Pen Pal Correspondence, " were published with the Cold War leaders' more formal, public letters in the State Department volume Foreign Relations of the United States [FR US], 1961-1963, Volume VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996) .
Khrushchev's first letter was written from a retreat beside the Black Sea. While the Berlin crisis was still not over, the Soviet premier began the correspondence with his enemy by meditating on the beauty of the sea and the threat of war. " Dear Mr. President, " he wrote, "At present I am on the shore of the Black Sea . . . This is indeed a wonderful place. As a former Naval officer you would surely appreciate the merits of these surroundings, the beauty of the sea and the grandeur of the Caucasian mountains. Under this bright southern sun it is even somehow hard to believe that there still exist problems in the world which, due to lack of solutions, cast a sinister shadow on peaceful life, on the future of millions of people. " Now as the threat of war over Berlin continued, Khrushchev expressed a regret about Vienna. He said he had "given much thought of late to the development of international events since our meeting in Vienna, and 1 have decided to approach you with this letter. The whole world hopefully expected that our meeting and a frank exchange of views would have a soothing effect, would turn relations between our countries into the correct channel and promote the adoption of decisions which would give the peoples confidence that at last peace on earth will be secured. To my regret-and, 1 believe, to yours-this did not happen. "
"I listened with great interest to the account which our journalists Adjubei and Kharlamov gave of the meeting they had with you in Washington. They gave me many interesting details and I questioned them most thoroughly. You prepossessed them by your informality, modesty and frankness which are not to be found very often in men who occupy such a high position. " "My thoughts have more than once returned to our meetings in Vienna. I remember you emphasized that you did not want to proceed towards war and favored living in peace with our country while competing in the peaceful domain. And though subsequent events did not proceed in the way that could be desired, I thought it might be useful in a purely informal and personal way to approach you and share some of my ideas. If you do not agree with me you can consider that this letter did not exist while naturally I, for my part, will not use this correspondence in my public statements. After all only in confidential correspondence can you say what you think without a backward glance at the press, at the journalists. " "As you see," he added apologetically, " I started out by describing the delights of the Black Sea coast, but then I nevertheless turned to politics. But that cannot be helped. They say that you sometimes cast politics out through the door but it climbs back through the window, particularly when the windows are open.... I note with gratification that you and I are of the same opinion as to the need for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of Laos . "

9/18/1961 UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold was killed when his DC-6B airline crashed in a jungle near Ndola in present-day Zambia (the Congo), shortly after midnight. He had been en route to Northern Rhodesia. The others on the plane were killed instantly, but Hammarskjold and an aide were thrown clear. Though the plane was several hours overdue and a police inspector phoned the airport to describe a mysterious flash, no search party was organized until 10am. The wreckage was sighted at 3:10pm. Hammarskjold had died during the night, but his aide, Sgt. Harold Julien, a security officer, survived for five days and raved about explosions and sparks in the sky. A postmortem established that two of the victims were riddled by bullets, officially from a box of ammo that had exploded on impact. The official verdict was "pilot error." Harry Truman commented, "Dag Hammarskjold was on the point of getting something done when they killed him. Notice that I said, 'when they killed him.'" (The Peoples’ Almanac #3  p58)   
The NYT this morning (9/17 in the US) featured an AP dispatch headlined "Tshombe Confers with UN's Chief on Katanga Truce." The story said, "Hammarskjold and President Moise Tshombe of Katanga Province met for more than an hour...Separate planes brought Mr. Tshombe and Mr. Hammarskjold to Ndola, 130 miles southeast of the Katanga capital of Elisabethville...Mr. Hammarskjold's chartered DC-4 from Leopoldville landed about four hours after Mr. Tshombe arrived." None of this was true; Hammarskjold's plane never arrived from Leopoldville; the meeting described in the AP story never happened. The entire story was faked by someone at AP, and it got out on the wires before Hammarskjold's death was announced. (Unreliable Sources p33)

9/21/1961 An inter-agency report on Soviet nuclear capabilities, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 11-8/1-61, is disseminated within the government. The NIE and later intelligence reports show for the first time that the Soviet ICBM program is far behind previous U.S. estimates. Only some ten to twenty-five Soviet ICBMs on launchers are believed to exist, with no major increase in Soviet ICBM strength expected in the near future.

Oct 1961 At the Geneva Conference, Averell Harriman was trying to carry out the president's order to negotiate a settlement for a neutral Laos. JFK had been explicit to him that the alternative was unacceptable: "I don't want to put troops in." Harriman brought to the conference the asset of a mutual respect with the Russians. He had done business in the Soviet Union. The Russians regarded Harriman as a friendly capitalist. He and Nikita Khrushchev had visited each other for informal diplomatic exchanges, first at the Kremlin, then at Harriman's Manhattan home, during the year before Kennedy became president. JFK had recognized Khrushchev's confidence in Harriman and would use that relationship later to great effect when Harriman represented JFK in negotiating the test ban treaty with Khrushchev in Moscow. In Geneva, Harriman and his counterpart, Soviet negotiator Georgi M. Pushkin, were developing a wary friendship as they tried to find a way together through Laotian battlegrounds and Cold War intrigues. While representing opposite, contentious sides of the Cold War, Harriman and Pushkin respected each other and were inclined to conspire together for peace. A turning point at Geneva came in October 1961, when leaders of the three Laotian factions agreed to neutralist Souvanna Phouma 's becoming prime minister of a provisional coalition government. Then, as Rudy Abramson, Harriman's biographer, put it, the Soviets " agreed to take responsibility for all the Communist states' compliance with the neutrality declaration and accepted language declaring that Laotian territory would not be used in the affairs of neighboring states-meaning the North Vietnamese could not use the trails through Laos to support the insurgency in South Vietnam. " This largely unwritten understanding would become known in U.S. circles as the " Pushkin agreement. " A major obstacle arose, however, when the Soviets, the North Vietnamese, and the Pathet Lao insisted on the right of all three Laotian factions to approve any movements of the International Control Commission. The Pathet Lao would thereby be given a veto power over inspections to monitor violations of the accord. The communists wouldn't budge on the issue. With the Pathet Lao controlling the battlefield, Harriman became convinced that the Geneva Conference would collapse unless the United States was willing to compromise. Although the State Department was adamantly opposed, Kennedy reluctantly decided with Harriman that the critical compromise with the Communists was necessary. The negotiations moved on. But from then on, a "neutral Laos " would take the form of a partitioned country under the guise of a coalition government. Georgi Pushkin would soon die. The agreement named after him would never be honored by Soviet leaders, who lacked the power to tell the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese what to do. The corridor running down the eastern border of Laos would become known as the " Ho Chi Minh Trail" for its infiltrating North Vietnamese soldiers on their way to South Vietnam-or as State Department critics would call the same route, the "Averell Harriman Highway. " Kennedy, struggling to avoid both war and Communist domination of Laos in the midst of the larger East-West conflicts over Cuba, Berlin, and the Congo, was happy to get the compromise Harriman had worked out with Pushkin. The president's most bitter opponents to a Laotian settlement, in the Defense Department and the CIA, tried to destroy the agreement. They kept up their support of General Phoumi's provocations and violations of the cease-fire. Rudy Abramson, Spanning the Century: The Life of W. Averell Harriman, 1891-1986 (New York: William Morrow, 1992), pp. 586 - 87.

10/16/1961 Kennedy responded privately to Khrushchev on October 16, 1961, from his own place of retreat beside the ocean, Hyannis Port:
"My family has had a home here overlooking the Atlantic for many years. My father and brothers own homes near my own, and my children always have a large group of cousins for company. So this is an ideal place for me to spend my weekends during the summer and fall, to relax, to think, to devote my time to major tasks instead of constant appointments, telephone calls and details. Thus, I know how you must feel about the spot on the Black Sea from which your letter was written, for I value my own opportunities to get a clearer and quieter perspective away from the din of Washington . " He thanked Khrushchev for initiating the correspondence and agreed to keep it quiet: " Certainly you are correct in emphasizing that this correspondence must be kept wholly private, not to be hinted at in public statements, much less disclosed to the press. " Their private letters should supplement public statements " and give us each a chance to address the other in frank, realistic and fundamental terms. Neither of us is going to convert the other to a new social, economic or political point of view. Neither of us will be induced by a letter to desert or subvert his own cause. So these letters can be free from the polemics of the 'cold war' debate. " Kennedy agreed wholeheartedly with Khrushchev's biblical image: " I like very much your analogy of Noah's Ark, with both the 'clean' and the 'unclean' determined that it stay afloat. Whatever our differences, our collaboration to keep the peace is as urgent-if not more urgent-than our collaboration to win the last world war. "
In his October 16, 1961, letter to Khrushchev, Kennedy said, as he had in his verbal message through Salinger and Kharlamov three weeks before, that any second summit meeting should be preceded by a peaceful resolution of Laos: " Indeed I do not see how we can expect to reach a settlement on so bitter and complex an issue as Berlin, where both of us have vital interests at stake, if we cannot come to a final agreement on Laos, which we have previously agreed should be neutral and independent after the fashion of Burma and Cambodia . "

10/28/1961 This morning the Soviet tanks backed away, and the U.S. tanks followed suit in thirty minutes. The Checkpoint Charlie crisis was over. Its resolution prefigured that of the Cuban Missile Crisis one year later. In both cases Kennedy asked Khrushchev to take the first step. The Soviet leader did so, in gracious recognition that Kennedy was under even more intense pressure than he was. In both cases a back-channel communication via Robert Kennedy was critical. And in both cases Khrushchev, in withdrawing his tanks and later his missiles, achieved his own objectives in exchange from Kennedy: the removal of U.S. threats to bulldoze the Wall and to invade Cuba, and the withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey and Italy.

11/8/1961 JFK told the public, "The Soviet Union prepared to test [nuclear weapons] while we were at the table negotiating with them. If they fooled us once, it is their fault. If they fool us twice, it is our fault."   

11/9/1961 Khrushchev, in his second secret letter to the president, on November 9, 1961 , regarding Berlin, had hinted that belligerent pressures in Moscow made compromise difficult from his own side. " You have to understand, " he implored Kennedy, "I have no ground to retreat further, there is a precipice behind. "

11/16/1961 JFK gives a speech at the University of Washington (Seattle): "We must face the fact that the United States is neither omnipotent nor omniscient - that we cannot impose our will upon the other 94 percent of mankind - that we cannot right every wrong or reverse every adversity - and that therefore there cannot be an American solution to every world problem."   "We cannot as a free nation, compete with our adversaries in tactics of terror, assassination, false promises, counterfeit mobs and crises."

11/25/1961 JFK met at Hyannis Port with Georgi Bolshakov, who was identified as "a Soviet editor." Actually, he was a major in Soviet intelligence and Khrushchev's secret envoy to the Kennedys.
« Last Edit: November 08, 2013, 07:42:20 pm by TLR »

TLR

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Re: Kennedy and the Cold War
« Reply #2 on: July 17, 2013, 10:38:05 pm »
12/1/1961 Gus Hall and Benjamin Davis, officials of the US Communist Party, were indicted on 12 counts of violating the registration provisions of the McCarran Act. They were released on bail of $5000 each. The Hall-Davis Defense Committee was created 4/1962 on their behalf. The Committee's chief lawyer was John Abt.

12/31/1961 On December 31, 1961, Trappist monk Thomas Merton wrote a letter anticipating the Cuban Missile Crisis ten months later. It was addressed to Clare Boothe Luce, the wife of Time-Life-Fortune owner Henry Luce, a Cold War media baron whose editorial policies demonized the communist enemy. Clare Boothe Luce, celebrated speaker, writer, and diplomat, shared Henry Luce's Cold War theology. In 1975 Clare Boothe Luce would lead investigators into the JFK assassination, working for the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), on a time-consuming wild goose chase based on disinformation. HSCA analyst Gaeton Fonzi discovered that Luce at the time was on the board of directors of the CIA-sponsored Association of Former Intelligence Officers. Even in the early sixties, Merton with his extraordinary sensitivity may have suspected Luce's intelligence connections. In any case he knew her as one of the wealthiest, most influential women in the world, with a decidedly anti-communist mind-set. He welcomed her, as he did one and all, into his circle of correspondents. In his New Year's Eve letter to Clare Boothe Luce, Merton said he thought the next year would be momentous. " Though 'all manner of things shall be well,' " he wrote, "we cannot help but be aware, on the threshold of 1962, that we have enormous responsibilities and tasks of which we are perhaps no longer capable. Our sudden, unbalanced, top-heavy rush into technological mastery, " Merton saw, had now made us servants of our own weapons of war. " Our weapons dictate what we are to do. They force us into awful corners. They give us our living, they sustain our economy, they bolster up our politicians, they sell our mass media, in short we live by them. But if they continue to rule us we will also most surely die by them. "  Merton was a cloistered monk who watched no television and saw only an occasional newspaper. However, he had far-flung correspondents and spiritual antennae that were always on the alert. He could thus identify in his letter to Clare Boothe Luce the strategic nuclear issue that would bring humanity to the brink in October 1962: " For [our weapons] have now made it plain that they are the friends of the 'preemptive strike'. They are most advantageous to those who use them first. And consequently nobody wants to be too late in using them second. Hence the weapons keep us in a state of fury and desperation, with our fingers poised over the button and our eyes glued on the radar screen. You know what happens when you keep your eye fixed on something. You begin to see things that aren't there. It is very possible that in 1 962 the weapons will tell someone that there has been long enough waiting, and he will obey, and we will all have had it. " "We have to be articulate and sane , " Merton concluded, " and speak wisely on every occasion where we can speak, and to those who are willing to listen. That is why for one I speak to you, " he said hopefully to Luce. "We have to try to some extent to preserve the sanity of this nation, and keep it from going berserk which will be its destruction, and ours, and perhaps also the destruction of Christendom. "  (JFK and the Unspeakable, Douglass)

Feb 1962 On the 20th anniversary of the Voice of America, Kennedy said, "We seek a free flow of information...We are not afraid to entrust the American people with unpleasant facts, foreign ideas, alien philosophies, and competitive values. For a nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people."

Apr 1962 Jupiter missiles in Turkey were made fully operational.

Late April 1962: While vacationing in the Crimea, across the Black sea from Turkey, Khrushchev reflects on the Turkish missiles and reportedly conceives the idea of deploying similar weapons in Cuba. Soviet sources have identified three reasons that might have led Khrushchev to pursue the idea seriously. The deployment of missiles in Cuba would: (1) perhaps most important, increase Soviet nuclear striking power, which lagged far behind that of the United States; (2)  deter the United States from invading Cuba; and (3) psychologically end the double standard by which the United States stationed missiles on the Soviet perimeter but denied the Soviets a reciprocal right. Upon returning to Moscow, Khrushchev discusses the idea with First Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan . Although Mikoyan is opposed,  Khrushchev asks a group of his closest advisers, including Frol Kozlov, Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) Sergei Biryuzov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko , and Marshal Malinovsky to evaluate the idea. The group proposes that a mission be sent to Cuba to see if Fidel Castro would agree to the proposed deployment and to determine whether the deployment could be undertaken without being detected by the United States. (Garthoff 1, p.13)
   
4/25/1962 US resumed atmospheric nuclear tests at Christmas Island in the South Pacific in response to resumed Soviet testing. Further explosions follow 4/27 and 5/2. The United States then carried out a series of twenty-four nuclear blasts in the South Pacific from April to November of 1962.

7/4/1962 JFK said in a speech that he looked forward to a "declaration of interdependence" that would strengthen ties between the US and Europe.

7/6/1962 US lifted severe travel restrictions on Soviet visitors.

8/9/1962 Soviets rejected new US proposals to break the deadlock in negotiations for a nuclear test ban.

9/15/1962 Letter from JFK to Khruschev, declassified 12/1989. "SECRET - EYES ONLY. I am happy to note your suggestion that you are prepared to negotiate a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in the immediate future...we should at the same be negotiating towards a treaty for banning nuclear weapons tests in all environments...A test ban agreement, together with an agreement on the nondissemination of nuclear weapons...would have a powerful effect in detering the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities to other countries."

11/12/1962  Premier Khrushchev sends President Kennedy a message confirming the removal of the missiles. The letter adopts a friendly tone, commenting on the outcome of the November 6, 1962 elections in the United States: "You managed to pin your political rival, Mr. Nixon, to the mat," the letter comments on the fact that Nixon lost his bid to become governor of California. "This did not draw tears from our eyes either." (Document 69, Premier Khrushchev 's Letter to President Kennedy, 11/12/62)

11/29/1962 Kennedy: "...I am certain that after the dust of centuries has passed over our cities, we, too, will be remembered not for victories or defeats in battle or in politics, but for our contribution to the human spirit." Closed-circuit television broadcast on behalf of the National Cultural Center from the National Guard Armory in Washington, D.C., November 29, 1962

12/5/1962  Sen. Richard Russell, in a TV interview in Atlanta, lamented that the US was now "babysitting for Castro and guaranteeing the integrity of the communist regime in Cuba."

12/6/1962 Arthur Sylvester, Asst. Sec of Defense for Public Affairs, was asked by a reporter about JFK's "cold" during the beginning of the missile crisis; Sylvester explained, "it's inherent in government's right, if necessary, to lie to save itself when it's going up into a nuclear war. That seems to me basic." (12/7 NYT)

12/14/1962 President Kennedy writes to Premier Khrushchev in response to Khrushchev's December 11 message. The letter thanks Khrushchev "for [his] expression of appreciation of the understanding and flexibility we have tried to display" and expresses hope that a final settlement to the "Cuban question" could be found quickly. Kennedy also discusses communications between the two leaders during the missile crisis: he suggests that the use of reporters such as John Scali is not a satisfactory method of transmitting messages and expresses disappointment that Georgi Bolshakov, the channel for many exchanges between Kennedy and Khrushchev, is being called back to the Soviet Union. (President Kennedy 's Response to Khrushchev 's December 11 Letter, 12/14/62)

12/17/1962 Federal jury in Washington convicts US Communist Party of failure to register as agent of the USSR, and Judge Alexander Holtzoff fines the party $120,000. During the trial, defense attorney John Abt argued that the act of registration was self-incriminatory. The Supreme Court would later overturn the decision of the federal court.   

12/19/1962 Premier Khrushchev sends a letter to President Kennedy suggesting that the "time has come now to put an end once and for all to nuclear tests." He writes, "with the elimination of the Cuban crisis we relieved mankind of the direct menace of combat use of lethal nuclear weapons that impended over the world. Can't we solve a far simpler question--that of cessation of experimental explosions of nuclear weapons in the peaceful conditions?" Kennedy responds to Khrushchev's letter on December 28. (Khrushchev 's Letter, 12/19/62; Garthoff 1, pp. 131, 134)

9/30/1963 President Kennedy reopens a secret channel of communication between himself and Nikita Khrushchev, via Press Secretary Pierre Salinger and a Washington-based Soviet Secret Police agent. He thereby circumvents a State Department he can no longer trust for his communications with the Soviet leader.

10/7/1963 JFK signed the Test Ban treaty in Washington, prohibiting nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater or in outer space. The Dallas Morning News condemned him as "50 times a fool."

10/9/1963 JFK announced sale of 150 million bushels of wheat to the Soviets, costing them $250 million. "...it does represent one more hopeful sign that a more peaceful world is both possible and beneficial to us all."

10/10/1963 Dallas Morning News attacked JFK for resisting the recent "seizure of power by anti-communist forces" in Honduras and the Dominican Republic.

10/4/1965 Pope Paul VI addressed the UN General Assembly: "Listen to the lucid words of the great departed John Kennedy, who proclaimed, four years ago, 'Mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to mankind.' No more war, war never again! Peace, it is peace which must guide the destinies of peoples and of all mankind." 
« Last Edit: November 08, 2013, 07:48:53 pm by TLR »